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The Interpreter
@Interpreter_Mag
Russian-to-English translation journal, with original analysis and commentary on Russia's foreign & domestic policy.
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KGB Manuals Revealed

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The Interpreter
@Interpreter_Mag
Russian-to-English translation journal, with original analysis and commentary on Russia's foreign & domestic policy.
Interpreter_Mag
Exposure of the Enemy's Set-Ups: Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Introduction

Some methods of penetration of the enemy's set-ups [dangles] in an agent's network of intelligence agencies of the socialist states.

Methods and means of detecting set-ups in the process of developing persons interesting to intelligence.

Conclusions

The Interpreter
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Russian-to-English translation journal, with original analysis and commentary on Russia's foreign & domestic policy.
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Notes on Exposure of the Enemy's Set-Ups

Top Secret

Copy No.

Exposure of the Enemy's Set-ups [Dangles] in the Process of Development of Persons of Interest to Intelligence

1971

Print run 50

Journal no. 174/79-2Icc

Publication no. 6/20

Introduction

The clash of the two world systems has intensified in recent years. The imperialist countries are blocking progress. The socialist countries' intelligence play an important role in exposing the imperialists' aggressive plans.

Above all they help recruit people sympathetic to socialism.

Enemy intelligence's primary goal is to prevent penetration; they organize set-ups for this purpose to gather intelligence, expose intelligence agents, paralyze their activity and organize provocations as well as disinformation.

A document of British counterintelligence illustrates the important role set-ups play. Quote "We must always have in mind the opportunity of setting up highly-qualified double agents of such value to socialist intelligence agencies that in time they will transfer them from official communication with the local mission to the intelligence network."

There has to be constant vetting of agent networks' acquisitions and persons of interest to intelligence to expose set-ups.

Each new contact has to be carefully analyzed by agents as to their behavior, and they have to vet persons of interest thoroughly.

Methods of Penetration

Enemy intelligence organizes their efforts in characteristic ways:

- use of especially prepared staff official or agent

- recruiting an intelligence operative from a socialist country and setting them up to recruit others

- re-recruiting an exposed agent from a socialist country

This textbook will not look at the last category, just the first two.

Enemy intelligence gathers a lot of data on prospects and puts them under surveillance when they come to their country; they study their work regimen, behavior at work, personal life, relations with others in their foreign colony.

They then make contact through official state work, diplomatic receptions, during movie showings, press conferences etc. Sometimes they use public places and pretend to run into a prospect accidentally. It could be a restaurant, cafe, park, museum, athletic club, etc.

Example: Intelligence officer Stoyanov in 1968 met a local lawyer, "Veronets," who tried to convey his progressive views; then reported to the rezidentura and got approval for another meeting. But he failed to vet Veronets and get info from him at several meetings. He noted that Veronets gave him info on Catholic trade unions and asked where he got it; he said through the head office of the city association of Catholic trade unions. At the next meeting Veronets pointed out a woman "Soroka," and said he got it from her and introduced her. She said she was the deputy secretary of the association of Catholic trade unions and had to keep contact with foreign diplomatic missions.

But the Center could not verify them, and the rezidentura didn't vet them. Stoyanov returned to the Motherland and turned Veronets and Soroka over to another agent, Georgiev. Soroka then tried to recruit Georgiev; then the rezidentura got to work checking him and analyzing the info and realized it all came from Italian counter-intelligence.

The agent should have realized that Veronets' claim to get "interesting info" at the very first meeting should have been a tip-off. That would have avoided two months of Italian agents working over these Soviet agents.

Example of another complex set-up from autumn 1943. Guber, a lieutenant in the German army, voluntarily turned himself over at the Soviet-German front. He was put in a POW camp, educated in anti-fascist school, recruited to help education German POWs.

"In the labor camp, 'Guber' took part in the exposure of two underground fascist groups that had tried to make contact with Germany. He recommended himself as a progressive person, an opponent of the Hitler regime."

"After the war, 'Guber' was released from labor camp, but in 1950 Soviet intelligence began to train him for the purpose of placement in the FRG for illegal work. 'Guber' received operational and technical training."

They created a legend for his stay in the GDR as a refugee from the FRG. Real facts of his biography were used, his address in Munich, his father's name Wilhelm, a dentist, who had died early in the war; he said he had been drafted in the German army in 1943 from his third year in Jena university medical school.

The Center decided to check this, found the father, but not Guber himself; they also found his supposed address had been bombed out. A neighbor said Wilhelm had really been killed in bombing but had no children.

In 1945, the British took the whole archive of Jena University but ingenious operatives were able to find an old accountant who used to issue ration cards to the students and had lists of them; there was no Guber, and no evidence that students in the 3rd year were even drafted. When they were drafted, they had bonus bread ration cards and then he would have listed their name; he didn't have anyone similar to Guber.

Guber was arrested and confessed that he served with the German military in Africa, had been captured by the British and trained and sent to the Soviet-German front to give himself up as a POW/intelligence agent.

So the British cleverly fooled the Soviets figuring that with a huge flow of POWs, the Soviets would think Guber was "natural".

Enemy intelligence will create events to make contact if they can't do so naturally. They will create fictitious agencies, "progressive" publishing houses, etc. to attract the socialist intelligence agencies who want to use such organizations for their own purposes, and also to take over progressive movements by planting their own agents in them.

Sometimes an enemy agent will try to interest socialist intelligence by saying he has a job in a facility of intelligence interest, even if he has no access to intelligence. They might speak of their ties to intelligence or counter-intelligence or police which they broke off to become progressive.

In 1969, the Hungarian intelligence agent Janos who worked as an engineer of a Hungarian trade agency in England met "Gretta," a technical secretary of the West German embassy at a reception hosted by the British Foreign Office.

"'Gretta' expressed progressive views and reported that she was 26 years old, was unmarried, and was the daughter of wealthy parents, but had broken off [relations] with them and had gone to England. In London, she found a job at the FRG embassy."

She tried to convince Janos she was interested in him but was disappointed that he was married. She kept meeting with him. She said she had to type a lot of documents but didn't read into them. Janos didn't bite. Then she said she could go back to Germany and get a job in the foreign ministry with her connections. She shared some tidbits on German-British relations from deciphered correspondence. Janos still didn't bite.

"'Gretta' reported to the intelligence officer that she had to type a large quantity of documents for the advisor, but she typed mechanically, not reading into them. Since Janos did not react to this, at the next meeting, she gave him to understand that if he wanted, she could return to the FRG and get a job there at the Foreign Ministry, as she had good connections. Once 'Gretta' shared with the intelligence officer several interesting reports about mutual relations between the FRG and England, noting that she learned about this from encoded correspondence of the ambassador with the FRG foreign ministry."

Her insistence and aggressiveness and broad hints of collaboration only made Soviet intelligence suspicious, so when they put her under surveillance they discovered she contacted Biarits, an official of German security. They found it obvious German intelligence was trying to plant her.

Sometimes the enemy sent plants that were so obvious that they would be deliberately exposed, thus making the socialist intelligence agencies reluctant to cooperate even with real prospective helpers.

In 1968, the Czech Embassy in France received three issues of a classified journal on aviation of interest to military intelligence. They were unable to find out anything about the sender. Then "Albert" came to the Czech Embassy to ask if the three journals were received. Agent Novak spoke to him but was evasive and then he didn't return or give his address; the Czechs were maybe over-cautious but they couldn't verify him.

Enemy counterintelligence sends anonymous letters to organize provocations and set up plants. They may even try to recruit agents not for their own country but others.

At a diplomatic reception in Ankara at the US Embassy, Polish intelligence officer Dombrowski met "John," a journalist who came from a meeting of the Central Treaty Organization (the Baghdad Pact, dissolved in 1979) from West Germany where he was based. John expressed anti-American views and said he had only come to the meeting to annoy Nixon. He planned to gather materials that would expose the US role in the Near and Middle East. He said he was for closer relations with the socialist countries.

John passed very interesting information about the meeting to the intelligence officer; this impressed Dobrowski and "dulled his vigilance." He kept passing info, refusing compensation but then let drop one day that his wife was seriously ill and her treatment ate up all his savings and he needed to ask the agent for cash. Then he started receiving payments but the rezidentura noticed his info was of little value and not secret. Once he said he was going to travel to the Near and Middle East and could perform tasks; once he got an assignment, however, he said his trip was cancelled. This put up red flags, he was vetted again and from newly-arrived info it was determined he was a CIA agent.

Enemy intelligence also uses these methods on agents they've detected from socialist countries:

- closing their eyes to real reasons of motivation and calling on patriotic sentiments;

- intimidating with prospect of police or court prosecution or firing from their jobs with kompromat;

- exposure to his homeland's intelligence.

The enemy puts great psychological pressure on them; even the most thorough training can't predict changes in behavior so watch for them.

Example from Cuban rezidentura in Italy: in 1970 Rodriguez, a Cuban intelligence officer met "Bertran," a local journalist in Venice.

Bertran offered Rodriguez to meet his friend, the journalist "Sart"; he said he had been a member of the Communist Party in France, fought in Spain in the International Brigade, then settled in Italy and joined a socialist party but had Marxist views. Sart offered to hand Rodriguez interesting information; Bertran then "characteristically" began to avoid meetings with Rodriguez. But Sart had nothing substantive, and soon Rodriguez was expelled from Italy; Sart was an Italian CI agent.

Practice shows that to plant agents, the enemy uses people who could be of interest to a socialist country and who are attractive in their personal qualities and behavior. He is very cautious at first when he expects he is being vetted. If more attention is paid some characteristics of a set-up can be observed. The planted agent usually has a legend of "intelligence opportunities"; he can offer info but it loses its value quickly; he tries to appear as someone willing to do anything to fulfill the recruiter's requests. To increase trust in himself, he shows great interest in the socialist countries; he tries to create conditions where the intelligence officer will become dependent on him or owe him something. Sometimes he displays excessive bravery and boldness and careless attitude toward security and doesn't behave conspiratorially enough. He keeps trying to get new assignments even though he hasn't performed the past ones.

He can be pushy, excessively curious and nosy about his personal life. He inserts fake biographical details and sometimes mixes them up or contradicts them. He tries to get him involved in immoral actions that might compromise him. This is the first signal of a provocation.

Methods and Means of Detecting the Enemy's Set-Up

The enemy tries to disorganize the work of legal rezidenturas through surveillance, forbidding travel to certain regions etc. and also tries to plant its agents. Therefore, all measures must be taken to prevent infiltration.

Vetting targets

Above all have the Center use its operational registries. Use official options like open reference materials, press, parliamentary reports, directories, foreign ministries, universities, political parties, telephone books, etc. Check the connections existing officers have with the local population. Through neutral connections, get info on family, work, education, career, political views, material situation, recreations, relatives, character. Always maintain conspiracy when obtaining such background info. Have a plan to mask and legend your interest in the target.

Using existing operational and archival materials, plants can sometimes be exposed. Don't expose yourself using official sources.

Examples: In the Soviet embassy in Bern, "Mertens," recommended as an organizer of a new opposition Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (now CDU) party in West Germany was received by an embassy official; he gave him his party program and told him the party sought Soviet government assistance. Mertens then asked for a visa to the USSR in order to personally get financing for the party. Then he went to the Czech Embassy in Switzerland and asked for a transit visa referencing his talks at the Soviet embassy which hadn't had a result yet. The Center determined upon a check that Mertens was a member of the Nazi party and collaborated with West German CI. Likely he was a plant. He had thought the CDU would interest the Soviets; FRG CI feared planting him in the GDR thinking he'd be exposed there, and so tried through Switzerland.

In a hospital in Mexico, where doctors from a socialist country worked, a certain "Juan" was admitted, regularly visited by "Pedro" who gave himself out as an Iranian foreign ministry official. Pedro, in talks with Juan's doctors, would try to turn the conversation to international topics. The rezidentura checked them out, didn't find anything. Intelligence officer Sabo learned from a local citizen Sanchez who worked as a guard at the hospital that Pedro was a local CI agent and he had seen him in police uniform. This helped the Soviets to avoid a set-up.

Study of the target

Gather personal impressions of the target to see how to influence him. Despite the increasing importance of using recruiter agents, development of persons of interest is also applied more widely especially in countries with difficult conditions. A lot of preparatory work has to be done, personal vetting activities, working out a legend for plausible acquaintance, determining base for meeting places etc. Keep to strict principles of conspiracy.

In Africa and the Near East, often intelligence officers visit people's homes or invite them to their homes but that exposes them to members of the family and neighbors and increases risks that local CI will notice.

Example of failed plant: a NATO official in France who was target by a Soviet officer went to his home, then the man's child, who studied in an international college, told his friends that a foreign visitor had come who brought tasty candies. The college head then told NATO security, and the plan failed.

But in African countries and oriental countries especially with small capitals, meet in homes. Better to make contacts without intermediaries to lesson chance of exposure. Meet those who already have a lot of foreign contacts so you don't stick out and avoid suspicion from local CI. Some targets may expose you by themselves making open phone calls or sending letters with their intent. There are some techniques to avoid this to be discussed in another subject heading.

Intelligence agent Klaus who worked in Rome as the first secretary of the GRD embassy met and successfully developed friendly relations with "Irwin,' first secretary of the US Embassy. A check determined that Irwin wasn't related to American intelligence. But he didn't hide the contact and CI found out. "Stanley," the second secretary of the US Embassy, came to a dinner with Klaus and after that Irwin avoided meeting Klaus or inviting him over. Stanley then kept trying to get information out of Klaus. Thus CI had used the connection to set-up the GDR intelligence.

Tell the target it's in his own interests to maintain secrecy; observe the target to check his information also check the person who gave you the lead to him. Note contradictions and evasions in his conversation; attempts to change the subject i.e. on autobiographical details and connections; and masking of his hostility; also nervousness, atypical agitation; artificial loquaciousness; excessive pushiness, etc.

Intelligence officer Stavinsky who worked as a correspondent in a Scandinavian country met a local journalist "Orvid" who was checked out. He was known to democratically minded persons in the country and in socialist diplomatic circles as progressive, and worked with papers in England, FRG, and Scandinavia.

The rezidentura studied him. In talks with Stavinsky, Orvid asked him sharp political questions; made contact with foreign diplomats and journalists eagerly - these were warning signs. Several agents were deployed to meet with him; material from the Center added to this; one of the agents heard Orvid let slip his hatred of communists who belonged in Russia in his view. He was then dropped.

Study and vetting of persons of interest

In difficult settings, especially the capitalist countries, you need to have rezidentura put under clandestine surveillance certain trusted government officials. The US, France England, FRG and other imperialist countries have put in measures to isolate officials from socialist institutions from government officials in their countries with classified information. Due to a presidential decree, under a loyalty oath, every official has to report his contact with socialist states. In France, the foreign ministry employees have to report on all countries with foreigners and emigres.

Under these conditions, attempts to contact such officials leads to exposure; therefore other trusted locals must be used to make the approach to them; it's easier for them to collect info.

Only verified, loyal and ideologically compatible intelligence officers of socialist countries can take part in vetting a target of recruitment. They have to have certain skills and also personal and work skills to do this, or undesirable consequences occur.

Example: Soviet intelligence officer Ivanov who worked in a West European country got from his agent Molodoy, with whom he had long been out of touch, a report that the cousin of agent Savva worked in the foreign ministry and had documents about the League of Arab Nations. Molodoy gave a good recommendation of the cousin and said he would cooperate with intelligence for material gain. He was checked out and put under surveillance. It turned out Molodoy was a CI agent using Savva as a dangle.

The rezidentura of Bulgarian intelligence tried to acquire an agent at a West European foreign ministry. But because of difficult conditions and active work of local CI, it was found that she was a dangle. The rezidentura got a tip about a typist called Liviya, age 25, single, but it wasn't prudent to work her up as her contacts would become known to CI. The rezidentura had information that Liviya was the school friend of the wife of a tested and loyal agent, Georgy. He was a doctor with a private practice and no relationship to the government. Therefore contacts with him weren't as difficult, so they decided to use him to check out Liviya. He said she was progressive and positive about socialist countries. She was attracted to a co-worker who was married with children but had an affair with him. He dropped her after she had a child by him. So her material situation was worse, and Georgy worked on her politically, although once she called him a communist. He said he wasn't but shared some of the CP's ideas. Liviya began to tell him of the material she typed at the foreign ministry. He was able to get information from her and ultimately documents and she was made an agent and valuable info was acquired.

Special vetting activities

These are used to check agents or confidential connections when there is suspicion they are part of local CI. They have to be customized individually and devised inventively to disguise themselves. Surveillance of both the target and the meeting place are needed to detect possible hostile persons or ambushes.

Example: In a Latin American country, Czech intelligence officer Marek who worked as director of the consular department of the Czech Embassy, noted "Armando," an employee of a local insurance country who officially meet Marek through his work and displayed great sympathy and provided some information that was of operational interest. There was no reason to suspect him of CI connections. At first Armando was reluctant to have meetings but then promised to provide some materials about the situation in the country. Two other rezidentura agents were sent to meet him, not Marek, whom he didn't know, and they discovered CI had the place under surveillance. Armando kept calling Marek at home and work after that to ask for a meeting but Marek said he was busy.

Several days later, Armando showed up at the Czech Embassy with "secret materials"; Market refused to take them and said he wasn't involved. Thus Armando was exposed as a dangle.

Another example involved "Charles", a Belgian foreign ministry official at the international fair in Leipzig, and Petrov, the Soviet intelligence officer who made contact with him. Charles seemed honest and progressive but doubts arose because he complained of lack of cash but had a nice suit etc. The info he passed was either uncheckable or didn't check out. Charles was put under surveillance but nothing was found after the meetings with the Soviet. Then they followed him in the evening leaving work or going to work in the morning. Then they found him meeting in the park with a CI agent an hour before work.

"By analyzing and re-checking data received from a target for recruitment development, it can be determined how honestly and consciously he fulfilled the intelligence officer's request, whether he hid information, which the enemy's counterintelligence is not interested in disclosing (for example, in indicating close friends of a neutral person, the target of the recruitment development does not name his contacts working in important targets, scientific research centers, in government offices where secret information is concentrated, etc.). On the basis of this and through conducting additional vetting activities it can be determined whom intelligence is dealing with: a dangle or an honest person."

"Special vetting operations through placing assignments to collect information on neutral persons are especially effective in those cases when there is the opportunity to determine if the enemy finds out about the interest of intelligence in these persons and whether he takes them on for development."

Task the target with collecting material on a neutral person and see if he does it without informing the person or telling others. In Vienna, agent Shtaub met Jack, a journalist from the FRG who lived in Paris. It was learned that Jack disapproved of US militarist policy and was in France for a long stay, with his wife, and had material difficulties. He didn't show any aggressiveness during meetings and returned to France. Belev, a GDR agent in France was assigned to make contact with Jack to check him out and had a good impression. He asked him to characterize four officials at a trade firm in the FRG in France. Among them was "Chameleon" who was said to be the FRG rezident in France; the three others were given for cover.

"Returning from the business trip, 'Jack' reported detailed information on these Germans, confirming what GDR intelligence already had."

At the next meeting, Jack told Belev that Chameleon was a spy and likely head of FRG's CI in France. Since his story was accurate, he was trusted more, but the Center said he needed more vetting.

Jack would sometimes go to a Scandinavian country on business; the agent asked Jack to find three Germans there, figuring that if he were a dangle, his interest in them would become known to the enemy, then through another rezidentura, this could be found out. Upon return, Jack provided detailed information on the Germans which confirmed what the GDR already knew about them. But after awhile the rezidentura in the GDR in Bonn reported that they had learned about the expression of interest to these Germans. Thus they were convinced that Jack was a dangle from FRG intelligence.

Bugging equipment and specially-equipped containers can be used to check a target. The Center can determine after the container has been in the hands of the target for awhile whether he gave it to others to open, or opened it himself out of curiosity.

Mavr, a code clerk at the foreign ministry came to the attention of the Cuban rezidentura. "In talks with the agent Gensolen, he extolled the achievements of the socialist countries in science, industry and culture. He agreed with the political line of the Cuban government, sharply criticizing the reactionary policy of the Americans and British."

But he kept his views hidden to those around him. The Center didn't have a file on him, he provided tips of people to recruit and even sold the code of the Spanish foreign ministry. Nothing seemed to be wrong but he seemed to know about conspiratorial work and it was decided to vet him. He was assigned at a meeting to pass a small suitcase to a certain person who was passing through the country, at a certain place and time two hours from the capital. If the person didn't show up, he was to return the suitcase to Gensolen. He then returned the suitcase saying the guy didn't show and the suitcase showed that he had tried to open it but had stopped so as not to leave a trace. From a bug in the suitcase it became clear he was working for American intelligence.

This shows that enemy intelligence is even willing to give up the secrets of another country, in the case Spain, to increase trust in the dangle.

Another trick is to compare the documents a target obtains and passes on with other copies obtained by other means. Hungarian intelligence officer Bela Kisha in London noticed Veb, an employee of a trade firm who indicated he was well informed and had ties with the military. The Hungarian established good relations with him and sometimes got information that seemed interesting at first glance, in exchange for cash.

But the Center said the information isn't beyond what was already in the press. Once Veb promised to Bela Kisha that he would obtain a very important document, and Bela asked for a photocopy. He was then able to compare it to what the Center had obtained and saw it was forged. Bela insisted that Veb tell him the source and workplace, which he resisted but finally he gave the info, and there was no such person and the phone was someone else's. So Veb was a plant either from British CI or more likely an adventurer just trying to get money.

Another method is to use the target's own postal address and ask him to perform an assignment he can't possibly do, but only with the help of a powerful intelligence service. Various methods have to be used to vet targets as any one may not turn up anything.

Conclusion

Such failures can lead to exposure even of the entire rezidentura and at least make work very hard; they happen when intelligence agents relax their political vigilance and are not concerned about constant improvement of their operational preparation or when they ignore the situation in the country, or fail to keep conspiracy.

"If through vetting measures the presence of a tie to counterintelligence is established with the target of development, then acquaintance with him should not be broken off immediately, since the agent may be deciphered. It will be more correct to conduct meetings with him less and less frequently and them stop them altogether."

The intelligence officer has to be a psychologist who an analyze even trivial things that come up in vetting.

Just using one of these methods may not enable the officer to detect whether he is dealing with an honest person or the enemy's set-up so he has to put an array of them into motion.

The Interpreter
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Russian-to-English translation journal, with original analysis and commentary on Russia's foreign & domestic policy.
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Political Espionage from USSR Territory: Table of Contents

Political Espionage from USSR Territory

Table of Contents

Introduction

Chapter 1. Organizational Structure, Tasks and Functions of Political Recruitment from USSR Territory

Chapter 2. Recruitment Work on Foreigners from the Territory of the USSR

1. Recruitment Contingent

2. Selection of Candidates for Recruitment

3. Establishment of Contacts with the Target of Development

4. Study of the Target of Recruitment Development

5. Completion of the Recruitment Development

6. Communications with Agents from Among Foreigners and Trusted Contacts from USSR Territory

7. Organization of Recruitment Work

Chapter 3. Recruitment of Agents from Among Soviet Citizens and Organization of Work with Them

Chapter 4. Obtaining Intelligence Information from USSR Territory

Chapter 5. Undertaking Active Measures from USSR Territory

Chapter 6. Organization of Intelligence Work at International Events

Conclusion

Appendix: Chart of Organizational Structure of Intelligence Agencies Undertaking Political Intelligence from USSR Territory

The Interpreter
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Russian-to-English translation journal, with original analysis and commentary on Russia's foreign & domestic policy.
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Notes on Political Espionage from USSR Territory

Yu.V. Andropov Red Banner Institute of the USSR KGB

SECRET

Political Espionage from the Territory of the USSR

Inv. 7031-A

[Redacted]

Moscow - 1989

Department 1

NIRIO

Approved by the USSR KGB PGU [First Main Directorate] as a teaching manual for students of the Andropov Red Banner Institute in special discipline course 1 and agents of external intelligence

Maj. Gen. V.M. Vladimirov, candidate of historical sciences

Col. Yu.A. Bondarenko, candidate of historical sciences

Under general edit of Maj. Gen. V.M. Vladimirov

108 pages

Table of Contents

Chapter 1

p. 6

"In 1932, the Statute on Foreign Departments and Sections of Authorized Representatives of the OGPU in certain republics, territories and regions was approved. At that time, more than 100 officers worked in the territorial intelligence divisions."

p. 7

In May 1947, Soviet government decreed that a unified organ for foreign intelligence be created: Committee for Information under the USSR Council of Ministers. This had the First Department which organized intelligence work in ministries and agencies. Aside from legal and illegal agencies abroad, this department could form intelligence sub-departments in ministries, agencies, scientific and civic organizations.

[The First Department responsible for personnel in virtually every Soviet office of any kind was run by the KGB throughout the Soviet period--CAF]

This was a successful measure, as the Committee for Information's 1950 report said "organization of this new task not only fully justified itself but opened up serious prospects for Soviet intelligence and broader use of additional channels to conduct intelligence work abroad".

The functions of that First Department were transferred to First Main Directorate (PGU) of the MGB (Ministry for State Security, KGB's precursor--CAF). Underneath the PGU was organized the 15th Department (later renumbered the 12th Department) to obtain political and scientific-technical intelligence through the counter-intelligence service of delegations and tourist groups travelling abroad. They were also charged with intercepting hostile activity among Soviet sailors and passengers on ships.

But practice showed uniting all those functions in one department was unwieldy so in 1957, the Second Main Directorate of the KGB was created to handle Soviet delegations and tourist groups abroad. The 12th Department then solely worked on scientific-technical espionage. In 1958, the monitoring of the ships was moved to external counter-intelligence.

"The process of the further development of intelligence from the territory of the Soviet Union was restrained, on the one hand, by the relatively small scale of the international ties of the Soviet Union, and on the other, by the conviction prevailing in those years that every foreigner who came to the Soviet Union fell into the field of view of the enemy's counterintelligence, and therefore could not be viewed as a prospective subject of recruitment work or as a reliable source of intelligence information."

Thus, the KGB was mainly involved in counterintelligence with these visitors and with the emigration

p. 9

But as a result of the "weakening of the forces of imperialism and the strengthening of the socialist system, the stormy process of the fall of the colonial system of imperialism began and the creation of independent states". UN membership went from 83 to 126; by 1986 there were 159 states in the UN. The USSR established diplomatic relations with 108 of these in the 1980s but by 1985 had diplomatic ties with 131. That meant active trade ties.

From 1966 to 1985, Soviet trade relations grew from 51 countries to 145. There were trade and economic agreements made and a new form of cooperation, scientific and technical.

During the Cold War, the capitalist states "significantly reinforced their counterintelligence services. As a result of the unfolding scientific and technical revolution, their surveillance and technical equipment was fundamentally renovated and perfected."

The imperialist states also helped the developing world to get equipped with these new technical devices.

"All of this to a significant degree complicated the operational setting in the overwhelming majority of countries under surveillance, and restricted to a certain degree the capacity of the KGB's rezidentura abroad. Furthermore, there was a disproportionate growth between the number of intelligence tasks and the number of 'legal' rezidenturas in many capitalist countries due to their establishment of quotas for Soviet representative offices".

p. 10

This is why in 1970, the KGB began to look for new ways to operate via Directorate RT. Tasks:

o obtain current political, military, strategic, economic and operational info useful to intelligence on the US, their close allies, and China

p. 11

o conducting active measures using the capacities of the KGB's divisions on political, military-strategic and economic issues, and also active measures to oppose subversive activities by the enemy's intelligence services

o organizing and coordinating intelligence work of the KGB's first divisions, guidance of officers of the active reserve

o running intelligence from the USSR through the ministries and KGB itself

o organizing agent networks of foreigners capable of obtaining intelligence information and running active measures, targeting facilities for penetration or other operational tasks

o recruiting Soviet citizens for intelligence work and active measures

o bringing foreigners into the USSR of interest to the KGB in order to study, develop and recruit them or to establish trusted ties in order to get intelligence and run active measures

o working out means of communication with agents

o preparation of background reports and intelligence reports

Directorate RT further developed in the 1980s to use the cover of ministries with foreign ties for intelligence work and to organize and coordinate work on foreign intelligence using the intelligence capacity of all the national and regional ministries with access to foreigners.

Service "A" of the PGU [First Main Directorate] worked on active measures, taking into account the real opportunities of each sub-division of the KGB (in the ministries) and targets for recruitment

pp. 12-14 - A lot on the structural changes of intelligence and the history of the variations of the KGB.

pp. 14-15 - PGU's work with their own KGB agents to train, deploy and keep tabs on them, organize trips abroad

p. 15

"Work with agents from among the foreigners and with those with trusted ties on USSR territory is conducted by the first (intelligence) sub-divisions of the KGB-UKGB independently. The conducting of meetings with them abroad in each individual case is coordinated with the PGU and is undertaken as a rule with the knowledge of the KGB rezidentura abroad".

Chapter 2

Section 1

p. 19

- recruiting agents inside the USSR is not that different than recruitment abroad. "The advantage of conducting recruitment work on USSR territory is the ability to create favorable conditions for influencing the foreigner in the necessary direction and using the entire arsenal of means and methods in recruitment work".

p. 20

Several million people visit the USSR every year and tens of thousands of them stay for longer periods Many of them are carriers of secret information.

Meanwhile, thousands of Soviet citizens go abroad to both capitalist and developing countries where they visit facilities of interest to intelligence.

Several thousand foreign government representatives in the USSR are of the most interest; 2,000 diplomats, 100,000 foreign students in 800 universities, of these about 60,000 from capitalist and developing countries. About 10,000 military people from 30 countries are trained in the USSR.

Some 60,000 to 80,000 Soviet citizens make business trips abroad.

Academy of Sciences provides wide opportunities because of 200 partnerships with academies in capitalist and developing countries.

The largest group of foreigners are undergraduate and graduate students, often on government exchanges. The Soviet Union provides scholarship through its Committees of Solidarity with Asia and Africa, the Committee of Youth Organizations of the USSR, the friendship societies, etc.

Children of government officials often among these students so are a good prospect for recruitment "even from countries far from socialist orientation".

Many with Soviet diplomas then get significant positions in government, political and economic organizations. The national liberation movements and fronts provide some of these students who are already ideologically compatible and who often have information of use to intelligence.

Those in internships in science especially are trying to get a good recommendation in the USSR so they can keep visiting it when their internship is over. Military trainees from generals to privates are of interest, especially given the role of the military in politics in the developing countries.

Others on scientific, cultural and economic exchanges often are prosperous in their own countries and are good for direct or indirect ties to targeted organizations.

pp. 23-24

Science is a particular rewarding channel as increasingly, scientists are called in to advise governments. Major American embassies abroad have special science groups which include scientists from research centers.

"In the leading capitalist countries, science centers, individual scientists, specialists in the field of social sciences are brought in to draft and establish government foreign policy and military strategy doctrines and also for the preparation of specific political, economic and military activities".

So the State Department, Pentagon, CIA, National Security Council in the US draw in specialists from universities and science centers. These can be recruited to enable penetration into US government institutions. The same for England, West Germany, France, Japan, Italy.

The same goes for businessmen interested in expanding trade with the USSR.

There are also the various Soviet "civic" organizations that can be used for intelligence because they have exchanges with foreigners -- the youth organizations, the Committee for the Defense of Peace, the friendship and cultural societies as well as solidarity committees and the Novosti Press Agency (APN)

p. 25

Churches and religion play an important role in the capitalist countries, have "serious influence on the political situation in their countries and on the activity of state and government agencies and civic organizations" so they are a target. The Russian Orthodox Church and the Armenian Gregorian Churches have parishes in the US, Canada, Latin America, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Finland, Turkey, India, and Morocco and have broad contacts with Muslim organizations as well which is "of great interest in connection with the importance of the 'Islamic factor' in the politics of many Arabic and other developing countries". There are also Soviet Baptists and Buddhists.

Among tourists visiting the USSR are political figures, government officials, businessmen, journalists etc. with access to secrets. While the brief nature of their visit and their packed programs can make it hard to recruit them, but some are already known to rezidenturas abroad and can be worked on further "and an opportunity is created to conduct the relevant operational measures."

p. 26

People with relatives in the USSR who stay longer for 3-6 months are another target: 1.5 million Russian emigres, more than 2 million Ukrainian, 1.5 Armenians, 800,000 Balts, many have preserved their national cultural and ties with relatives "of undoubted interest for the external intelligence of the KGB'.

Of course, they are "convinced carriers of bourgeois ideology as well, hostile and with prejudice regarding the socialist system, our state, and infected with anticommunism". The enemy's intelligence actively uses the science, cultural, sports and tourist channels for their own intelligence tasks and also conduct prophylactic work on those going to the USSR, putting them under surveillance with their own assets in the USSR, and intercepting undesirable contacts. After these foreigners return home, they are debriefed by foreign intelligence and followed in order to set up "provocative anti-Soviet actions".

p. 27

"Thus, insufficiently prepared actions, from the professional regard, in developing foreigners from USSR territory may be used by the enemy for compromising scientific, cultural and other ties with the Soviet Union and damaging inter-governmental relations of the USSR with certain capitalist and developing countries. All of this requires from intelligence [agencies] from USSR territory an unconditional maintenance of security for the measures conducted and close cooperation with the counterintelligence divisions of the USSR KGB."

Science centers as well as various party, business etc. offices abroad can be reached by Soviet visitors abroad when they can't be by the KGB legal rezidentura.

Directorate RT will then plan on various trips abroad the necessary agents or trusted persons to perform certain assignments.

p. 28

Section 2 - Selection of Candidates for Recruitment

Counterintelligence divisions of the KGB send to Directorate RT the names of people in capitalist and developing countries who may be used for intelligence work.

KGB harvests a certain amount of its data from Soviet citizens in various ministries who work with foreigners. Also scientists, journalists, trade officials "usually know their foreign colleagues' professions and interests very well and can successfully collect basic and personal reference data on foreigners which is actively used by the KGB's foreign intelligence".

Each time a foreign student goes to the USSR, he has to go through an application process. The agents' network becomes involved in the process of get-acquainted chats, and PGU operatives especially sent to various countries may be involved. After these students get to the USSR, they are studied via agents from among Soviet and foreign citizens in their universities, by administrative, professor and other personnel and by military in the cases of military training. Those staying for a few months or a year have more prospects for studying and recruitment.

Before recruiting, it should be determined what prospect the student has of getting a job in institutions of interest to Soviet intelligence.

p. 30 In some countries this would be a government or party post, but in other countries this would be impossible without connections with the right relatives. Sometimes those in the humanities have a better prospect for a job; other times it is technical and medical studies that would work. In some countries, Soviet diplomas are not recognized so the student has to go to Western countries to get a job of interest to intelligence.

Thus careful coordination must be made with all the PGU's geographical departments and the relevant rezidenturas. Otherwise this leads to unnecessary expense of funds and efforts to develop recruits of little use to intelligence.

Section 3

p. 31 Some potential recruits identified abroad can be invited especially to the Soviet Union for further work-over. They can either be invited directly or generically, if it is known that they are in the right position in a department that they would be the ones sent to the Soviet Union.

It's best if these potential recruits aren't the head of delegations going to the Soviet Union. The delegations invited can be large enough to ensure the inclusion of the person needed to recruit.

p. 32 but sometimes this can't be done for operational reasons so then an agent is sent to him from the USSR, under cover of a science trip or study abroad. Or an agent already residing in that country will be activated and a pretext for contact created.

A scientific institution could be used to establish initial contact via correspondence with the target of intelligence interest although this much attract the attention of the enemy's intelligence. Thus this method can only be used in certain cases depending on the position of the foreigner, the type of counterintelligence regimen in the country where he lives, the presence of convincing pretexts for organizing correspondence etc.

The Foreign Ministry, Ministry for Foreign Economic Ties, the State Education Committee, the Ministry of Culture, the Peace Committee, Academy of Science etc. can be used as well as theatre, art shows, cinema, tourism.

Opportunities for contact with foreigners come when they have to solve problems and resolve a conflict situation, for example, violation of customs rules, road accidents, or violation of other Soviet laws. Agents can be placed in trains, planes and hotels to make these approaches.

Always close contact with counterintelligence has to be maintained in studying the behavior and interests of foreigners, the places they visit most, their schedule etc. so as to orient agents toward their interests and facilitate circumstances for acquaintance.

In making the contact with the foreigner, learn his political views, his interests, his personal qualities and what's especially important, create a pretext for continuing the contact on the basis of mutual interests.

A file is drawn up that is called DPI -- Initial Study File. If the relationship is developed and begins to take on an intelligence nature, then a DOP is created -- Operative Development File.

p. 34

Section 4

follow-up - determine if he is sincere about relating to a Soviet representative, study his personal and professional qualities, political views and his real opportunities for intelligence gathering. Factors that make for successful study and recruit of foreigners:

- "long length and full program for each individual meeting

- opportunity and practicality of development with involvement with several intelligence officials and agents from among Soviet citizens

- more active and diverse use of surveillance tech and also external surveillance

- great scope for operational methods for the purpose of studying the foreign and also for influencing him in a way profitable to intelligence, as a result, for example of the positive effect on him of Soviet reality"

Irregular or rare meetings with foreigners don't enable the constant influence on him required.

"Organization of meetings with foreigners residing in our country do not involve serious difficulties. However, in this case a strict rule of compliance is in effect with requirements of tradecraft [konspiratsiya] and maintenance of security for every meeting, to avoid the detection of his connection to us to his fellow countrymen, especially intelligence officers working in the representative offices of his country in the USSR".

- can be very difficult or even impossible to meet with foreign government officials inside the USSR -- easier with scientists, students, businessmen. Some countries do not allow government officials to go to the socialist countries

p. 36

- Even with difficulties, various conferences, seminars, festivals, art shows, sports competitions, sister cities etc. can be used to make contact. Also personal contacts, invitations through civic and cultural institutions, even transit through the USSR en route to other countries can be used.

- foreigner should be handled by multiple agents in the interests of security; these can include intelligence agents working under cover in ministries; counterintelligence agents, agents from among Soviet and foreign citizens, trusted persons, and the special PGU reserve disguised as citizens from foreign countries.

p. 37

- assignments have to be clear, cooperation close, direction strictly centralized, with operational corrections on the fly given changing circumstances and new info

- avoid duplication of effort and exposure, complement one another; check info from others; compare notes on what the target says about other agents; determine the degree of the foreigner's sincerity and honesty

- needs to be kept under constant surveillance from the moment he crosses the border, from the hotel to the restaurant to other cities, etc.

p. 38

- make sure he has an agent who accompanies him everywhere, "his" person

p. 40

- use recruiting agents already in place with cover of the type of activity in which the target is engaged

- this creates more natural excuses for contact; the target may himself seek contact especially if the Soviet agent is prominent on the international scene; the foreigner will be less suspicious of him

- contact is then more natural and less dangerous

Section 5

p. 41

Use of psychiatrists in intelligence work:

- "Positive results are obtained by introducing qualified psychologists into the development of foreigner agents who provide scientifically-based characterizations of his personality."

p. 42

Use of actual recruiter or a false-flag person. "Recruitment is strengthened above all by giving intelligence tasks to the person recruited for collaboration, the performance of which violates certain legal or moral norms of his country. The inculcation of the newly-recruited agent of the habits of tradecraft, training of methods to perform intelligence tasks in keeping with his abilities and his ideological and political education are done in the process of managing the agent, taking into account the bases and forms of his recruitment."

p. 41

In recruiting on USSR territory, use ideological, political, material and moral-psychological foundations, often in combination with each other

For maximum success, at the last stage of recruitment, go deep into the motivations of why the subject wants to become an agent, either directly or under a false flag -- his character, motivations, interests, behavior.

"Recruitment is strengthened above all by giving the person brought into collaboration concrete intelligence tasks, the performance of which are related to violation of certain legal or moral norms in his country."

p. 42

While sometimes the foreigner will be ideologically compatible, often he is only partially compatible or not at all. A target may even be an opponent of socialism but needs cooperation with Soviet intelligence and may help it to resolve certain problems.

"Thus for example, the arms race and the threat of a nuclear conflict leading to the destruction of civilization on Earth forces citizens of capitalist countries, including those who hew to a bourgeois ideology, to cooperate with Soviet organizations and institutions and also directly with intelligence for the sake of preventing a nuclear disaster."

p. 43

Material motivation for cooperation can be very uneven; either the individual or his institution may need material assistance from Soviet science institutions, for example.

"Material incentives play a very important role in bourgeois society. They are at the foundation of bourgeois ideology and morality, which can be successfully used by the KGB's external intelligence".

For maximum success, at the last stage of recruitment, go deep into the motivations of why the subject wants to become an agent, either directly or under a false flag -- his character, motivations, interests, behavior.

"The moral and psychological basis offers a wide spectrum of moral, psychological and emotional factors. Individual elements of this basis are in particular career ambitions prestige factors, a sense of revenge, hatred, and love, nostalgia, personal attraction to the operational officer or agent, fear of consequences of the illegal deed committed."

p. 43

"Recruitment is strengthened above all by giving the person brought into collaboration concrete intelligence tasks, the performance of which are related to violation of certain legal or moral norms in his country."

pp. 43-44

"In recruitment work on Soviet territory, counter-intelligence agencies often use compromising materials. This has justified itself outside the USSR. However, for reasons of security, the KGB rezidenturas [KGB officers resident in an embassy or Soviet office in a foreign country-CAF] abroad very carefully approach contact with agents recruited on this basis, since in performing the tasks of state security agencies under pressure while in the USSR, may change their attitude toward cooperating with intelligence after returning to their homeland. In this regard, the intelligence divisions, cooperating with the counter-intelligence apparats, take timely measures to ensure the "transfer" of the agent recruited with compromising materials to an ideological-political or material basis. At any rate, such an agent, while in the USSR, must be sufficiently reliably ensured and vetted for performing sensitive intelligence tasks."

p. 44

"Diplomats and journalists accredited in the USSR cannot make a career without contacts among authoritative political and civic circles in our country. Foreign graduate students and interns need access to the materials and assistant of interest to them from representatives of the professorial and teachers' cohort, and sometimes the support of major scientific authorities with international recognition. Many political and civic figures in foreign countries need contacts with Soviet institutions and organizations for reasons of prestige, and sometimes strive to ensure themselves and their political groupings success in their domestic political arena as authorities in the area of relations of their country with the Soviet Union. All of these elements create bases for establishing contacts with foreigners, their operative development and attraction of them to intelligence cooperation."

p. 45

Be careful in recruiting agents from friendly countries, so if the mission fails, there won't be a disruption of relations.

Be "decisive" and "uncompromising" in recruiting agents from hostile countries.

"Agent relations are not established with citizens of developing countries of a socialist orientation. The relevant regulatory documents of the USSR KGB allow involvement of citizens from these countries only in the capacity of trusted contacts."

"The end goal of operational development of persons who hold high government and party posts and maintain official relations with Soviet state and party agencies, and also prominent scientists and successful businessmen is to establish with them, as a rule, trustworthy relations. The relations are not brought to the agent level with members of progressive organizations as well."

pp. 46-47

Soviet institutions like Institute for USA and Canada, Institute for the Far East, Institute for World Economy and International Relations, the Soviet Committee for Peace, etc. "are a convenient cover for the activity of political intelligence."

"Therefore, in recruitment work of foreigners contacting such agencies, often there is no need to reveal the affiliation of the recruiter to the state intelligence agents. The work can go on under the flag of these institutions."

The recruitment agent is introduced into the operation separate from the agent who is running the recruitment so that in the event of failure, the intelligence agent isn't exposed who is working through the cover institution.

This also enables more reliable control over the person being recruited by being able to see his reaction to the actions of the recruiter.

A recruitment agent is needed when the agent doesn't have enough background in the topic in which the foreigner specializers or doesn't have a position in the cover organization which would be at the foreigner's level and authoritative for him.

p. 48

"At the final stage of recruitment development, the systematic vetting of the foreigner continues. Since in this period he is beginning to be brought into specific tasks which are obviously of an intelligence nature, conditions are created for a deeper analysis of the reliability and loyalty of the subject of recruitment, whether he has for this the bravery, restraint, operational acuity, resourcefulness and readiness to take an intelligent risks, etc.

"For the purposes of vetting, such situations are created through which the real face of the subject of recruitment is revealed, his behavior in various conditions is seen and in contacting various people. The main role in such vetting measures is played by the agents' network of Soviet citizens and foreigners, widely making use of operational and technical means and external surveillance. In some instances, operational officers with experience in work under illegal conditions are planted with the recruitment subjects under the guise of foreigners."

p. 49

- Recruit must be brought deeper into "violation of certain legal, administrative or moral standards of his country, which confirms his readiness for practical intelligence cooperation and makes it impossible or difficult for him to refuse such cooperation in the future."

This is tricky because the subject may have second thoughts, go back and tell his own institution or intelligence of his country about his contacts.

"It is especially risky to transfer to the KGB rezidentura abroad an agent not established in practical work, who was recruited with compromising materials, since recruitment under pressure of such materials may leave the foreigner with a dislike toward intelligence, to its individual representatives, and maintain an internal dissent against the promise to cooperate given under coercion.

p. 49-50

To reinforce the trusted ties with recruits that don't have access to intelligence information:

"In that case, to reinforce the recruitment special measures are developed and conducted with create the impression in the foreign of his involvement in practical intelligence activity. For this, his is oriented toward collecting characteristic and particularly compromising data about his fellow countrymen, to turning over to intelligence unofficial news on the situation in his association or embassy."

This sometimes yields good results as preventive measures can be taken against his fellow countrymen or they can be expelled from the USSR on the basis of the target's reports

A student can be given tasks when he goes back to his homeland for the holidays such as finding out sensitive information, conducting active measures, or retrieving a controlled plant from a specially-prepared hiding place or even sending mail.

p. 51

Of course it's easier to deal with them on Soviet territory, more opportunities to watch their mood, their moral-psychological state and "to create the necessary atmosphere before a talk, during and after it, to document behavior and statements from the target and track his behavior and state after recruitment, to put additional influence on him in the event he shows hesitation, to reduce the negative consequences of a failed recruitment."

p. 52

Section 6

Communications

Meetings in person are the best

- using the official capacities of the agent who periodically visits the USSR

- another country where the operative or agent used from among Soviet citizens has official channels

- in third countries where the target lives or works temporarily where the agent can go

- at international events

- in transit countries the target may pass through

- on modes of transportation agreed in advance

Meetings in the Soviet Union are safer, the target will not feel he is watched.

Practical experience shows that regular contact can be made with:

-- foreign scientists who have regular contacts with Soviet science centers

-- employees of international and regional organizations where the USSR is represented

-- journalists, especially those specializing in international affairs

-- businessmen with ties to soviet trade organizations

-- those in the "free professions" (i.e. artists)

-- Foreigners with relatives in the USSR

p. 54

On the other hand, meetings on Soviet soil cannot be too frequent, and the information that the subject may obtain can get out of date. The recruit will have trouble bringing secret documents into the USSR, and may face financial hurdles to travel. Thus the recruit should have the capacity to pay for his own trips -- if Soviet intelligence reimburses him.

- the organization of meetings with agents and trusted contacts in their own country can only be done by especially-trained agents; they are not assigned to Soviet citizens without that training.

"If contacts with the agents or trusted contacts in their native country cannot be convincingly legended with their official position, then meetings with them are conducted only in extreme cases, in close cooperation with the rezidentura, in particular to obtain really valuable information or solving a one-time operational task."

p. 55

- Meetings in third countries are less dangerous; local intelligence agencies who have Soviet representatives under surveillance are less attentive to their contacts with citizens from other countries. In choosing the third country, take into account:

- nature of operational setting, counterintelligence, and visa regimen

- relations between the country of the agent's citizens and the country where the meeting will be; level of political, trade, science, culture, sports, tourist ties between them

- compatibility of citizens of that country with the country of the agent, on ideological, ethnic, race, religious grounds

- state of intergovernmental, political, trade, science, cultural and other relations of that country with the Soviet Union; number and quality of Soviet colony; attitude toward official Soviet agencies and public

- existence of business, science or other ties in that country or a pretext for visiting it

- ability to convincingly legend the trip to a third country for a Soviet representative and also the agent, if there are no official pretexts

- geographical location, convenience of transportation, level of travel expenses given official salary of agent

p. 56

Of course meetings in the target's home country or third countries aren't as favorable as in the Soviet Union, but this works for officials from secret facilities that are barred from visiting the Soviet Union; often this is the only way to have personal meetings with them.

Meetings at internal events are another option if the contact can be made without alerting the enemy's counter-intelligence.

"During the course of international events it is quite natural to have contacts and chats among representatives of various countries in the hallways, in an unofficial setting, a confidential exchange of opinions on questions discussed at official meetings, or negotiations for agreeing positions of concluding documents."

"Of special interest are conferences, seminars, and symposiums at which specialists in areas of knowledge of interest to intelligence are gathered."

Often the topics at one meeting involve discussion of the next one planned, so that contact can be arranged two or three times a year.

p. 57

Another method of contact is in a transit country. Since counter-intelligence more strictly polices the end point of trips by their citizens, and they pay less attention to transit points or are unable to maintain surveillance over them.

An "accidental" meeting can be arranged, and the target may not know that the coincidence of travel routes was in fact pre-arranged.

Nothing can guarantee that contacts can be maintained regularly, so in each case, consider the optimal combination of variables; for example, a scientist may be invited once a year to the USSR if he has an exchange with a Soviet science center. A Soviet citizen may then visit that person in his own country once or twice a year; they may both take part in international events once a year, and go to a third country once a year, etc. Thus 4-6 meetings a year using these different methods might be arranged.

Other means of contact:

p. 58

- short and long-wave radio contact

- secret drops, including on modes of transportation

- postal service

- encrypted messages and micro-photograph

- signals communication

Sometimes valuable intelligence may come by these means of communication, but often they are used only to set up the next meeting in a third country, etc.

The postal service is the most actively used means since the Soviet institutions or international organizations would have a reason for official correspondence.

Organizing regular and reliable communications is the most important condition for recruiting a target.

"Constant perfecting of the means of communication, a decisive refusal to use a regular template, initiative and inventiveness in this matter is the utmost duty of every operative."

Sometimes agents and trusted contacts brought into intelligence work while in the USSR are turned over to the rezidenturas abroad -- if they are reliable, vetted, if there are no conditions to work with them inside the USSR, if they can cooperate with the rezidentura, if there are specialists in that area of knowledge that the agent has, if productive and intensive work can be arranged.

p. 59

Agents are turned over to rezidenturas at a meeting as follows:

- the agent of the rezidentura makes the contact on behalf of the person who recruited the foreign inside the USSR

- operational contact is established, and an operative is sent abroad to work with the rezidentura to make the contact

- an officer from the Center is dispatched in certain cases

Only if the agent is vetted, strong, disciplined and trained in the necessary level of conspiracy should he be met; before risking a meeting with an insufficiently prepared agent, a preliminary contact can be made on neutral ground to study him, although this can get him exposed.

- Legend must be reliable

- Take into account level of professional and social position

- age of operative

- his resume (characteristics)

Sometimes an agent can't be passed on to the rezidentura because there is no one appropriate to take him. Especially for those with high-profile positions in their country, such as ambassadors, members of government, party leaders etc.

"Great difficulties emerge also with passing on trusted contacts from among military servicemen due to the KGB agent network's absence of a military cover or officials with military education capable of deeply understanding the relevant issues, and to understand and take into account the specifics of the professional psychology of servicemen, their circle of interests."

pp. 60-61

Section 7

Recruitment can be made by the RT Directorate alone without the involvement of other divisions of the KGB, or by other divisions but even so, is a complex measure in which parallel, officers of the PGU will be involved. The plan for recruitment has to be approved by the head of the division. The plan must contain the measures, their sequence, the tasks for the operatives and agents. Trips by the foreigner to the USSR or by the operative to the foreigner's country or to an international conference should be indicated.

Directorate RT, in cooperation with other divisions executives the join plan. Upon completion, a report is sent to headquarters signed by the RT division and sub-divisions that cooperated. Recruitment of foreigners with the help of the rezidenturas abroad is done through geographic divisions of Headquarters

When recruitment is made by geographical divisions, the central apparat maintains oversight and resolves specific issues, i.e. inviting a foreign to the USSR or a third country or sending a Soviet agent abroad in a delegation to an international event; in developing recommendations taking into account the ethnicity and citizenship of the foreigner.

If a foreigner is taken on and handed to the rezidentura, a report is made to the head of the territorial division of the KGB.

"Since diplomatic, journalistic and trade covers are widely used by the intelligence agencies of the enemy, the relevant categories of foreigners are developed above all by counterintelligence divisions of the KGB's central apparat and the territorial agencies of the KGB and UKGB."

Counterintelligence divisions inform the PGU of prospective recruits; conduct joint operations to study and develop the foreigner while he is in the USSR; and to follow up with him abroad.

Foreign intelligence takes part in recruitment of officials from diplomatic, trade and other foreign institutions in the USSR, and also journalists in the following cases:

- when the foreigner was already the subject of work by the rezidentura abroad and had been contacted

- when a Soviet citizen or RT agent maintains contact with the foreigner in accordance with his cover

- when the foreigner is preparing is leaving the USSR.

Foreign intelligence assists counterintelligence and provides it with the necessary information in recruiting a foreigner.

p. 64

At the completion of the recruitment, a report is sent with the signatures of heads of intelligence and counterintelligence divisions to the leadership of the USSR KGB or territorial division of the KGB with the proposal to include the foreign in the agentura or as a trusted contact.

Directorate RT and intelligence of territorial KGB offices recruit foreigners studying in the USSR and also independently recruit agents among foreign students for counterintelligence work.

Special departments of the KGB study the foreigners training in military institutions in the USSR. Then RT Directorate or the intelligence divisions develop the recruit.

The confirmation of a foreign military officer as an agent or trusted contact is made with a joint report of the military counterintelligence division of the KGB and Directorate RT. Then foreign intelligence puts the foreigner in the agents' network.

Chapter 3

Recruitment of Soviet Citizens

pp. 66-67

"Intelligence from USSR territory gives constant attention to a qualitative strengthening of the agent apparat of Soviet citizens, the improvement of all work with agents and trusted persons. The foundation of this apparat is the officers of Soviet foreign institutions, and also ministries maintaining international ties or contacts with foreign representatives, who are devoted to the cause of the Communist Party and socialist Motherland."

"Work with agents and trusted persons requires from the intelligence officer organizational skills, professional competence, the ability to cultivate, train and effectively use them for obtaining political, military-strategic, economic and operative information, to conduct active measures, the obtaining of leads to foreigners representing an interest to foreign intelligence, their study, development and recruitment, the defense of Soviet citizens from the subversive actions of the enemy, the guaranteeing of security at international events."

"An agent of KGB foreign intelligence from among Soviet citizens - a Soviet citizen who has been brought into secret collaboration by foreign intelligence on an ideological and political basis, and who, out of patriotic motivations systematically performs its tasks abroad and on USSR territory, maintains the fact of his collaboration and its content in secret, and observers the demands of conspiracy and discipline."

"A group leader is an agent who leads intelligence work of the agents among foreign citizens and trusted contacts given to him for communication, and also agents from among Soviet citizens."

"To maintain a safe house (on USSR territory _ a recruited Soviet citizen, residence of office space which is used by intelligence for operational purposes."

"The maintainer of the conspiratorial apartment (on USSR territory) is a recruited Soviet citizen who provides the necessary conditions for the agents' network and other work in the space which is used by state security agencies."

"An important task of the operational group is the daily, targeted search for persons who can be recruited, and in the process of active operation, adaptation and training be prepared as valuable agents".

Soviet citizens to pay particular attention to -- international specialists, country specialists, trade organization staff, economists, journalists, members of civic organization.

To study a candidate for recruitment, use official sources, agents' reports, surveillance, the KGB's information search system, personnel files, autobiography, personnel references, lists of scientific publications; check his nearest relatives;

Look for any obstacles: ideological inconsistency, spiritual and physical maladies, low moral qualities, talkativeness, insularity, prejudice, cowardice, etc.

Test his qualities by giving him assignments, but don't reveal that it is a KGB officer doing so; don't tell him specific targets of intelligence interest.

DPI - the preliminary study case file

Authorization to recruit a Soviet citizen as an agent must come from the chief of headquarters, his deputies, or heads of the KGB, with the submission of a report and the opening of a personnel and work file.

p. 70

The main form of communication is by personal meeting.

"At the meeting, the agent reports on the performance of assignments, discussed the information provided him, explains the circumstances of how he obtained d or the reasons why the assignment failed. With the agent's participation, a new assignment is made, the ways and means for its performance are defined, as well as the agent's lines of behavior. Each meeting must take place in a business-like atmosphere, stimulating the interest of the agent in the successful performance of the tasks placed before him. For deeper apprehensive of difficult and important tasks, the methods for doing them may be given in written assignments. A qualified setting for the assignments to the agents' network is one of the conditions for its targeted and active use."

p. 71-72

"The preparation and training of agents is undertaken concretely and constantly by observing the principle of an individual approach. Taking into account the political, general education and cultural level of the agent, his experience and skills, the features of his character, the difficulty of the tasks. A sense of high political vigilance is formed in agents, internal readiness to conscientious and decisive battle with the enemy's subversive activity, a deep understanding that the KGB's foreign intelligence operations are from the party's directives, in the interests of the state and Soviet people."

"In the process of cultivating and training the ability of the agent to see, discover facts and events of interest to the KGB's foreign intelligence, to analyze their essence and to give them an objective evaluation. Habits are instilled to establish and strengthen contacts with foreigners of interest to intelligence, and placing the necessary influence on them."

"In work with agents, principled, fair demands must be displayed, while observing tact, sensitivity, kindness and respect for the dignity of the individual. The operative must constantly recall that often the agent is assigned an important, difficult and sometimes dangerous assignment, for which he must not only be trained and cultivated, but also inspired in a human way. Therefore relations with him must be of the sort that he meets half way to report on the fulfillment of the assignment and in order to find both kind advice and friendly support from the operative, and if required even assistance. Each agent must be treated strictly individually, taking into account his age, professional and social standing, his character, the length of cooperation with intelligence, and his results. One must build relations with women agents particularly tactfully, and constantly take into account the psycho-physiological and other specific features inherent in them".

p. 77

Chapter 4

p. 79

"Agents and trusted contacts from among foreign students (students, graduate students, interns and military trainees) are able to visit the embassies of their countries, talk with their fellow countrymen coming to the USSR from among political and civic figures. Many of these agents and trusted contacts are members of various political groupings in their countries, active participants in national-liberation movements, with which they do not break contact even during their stay in the Soviet Union, which enables the tracking of internal political and internal party processes in the corresponding countries and political parties, and to detect changes in the political line of individual groups and in their relations among themselves in a timely matter."

- Agents have political as well as military info, especially in those countries where the army is active in political life through their representatives in the government, and economy

Important to have "timely proactive information about plans and intentions of foreign delegations and individual government and political figures from foreign states during their visit to the Soviet Union, about the questions they intend to raise with Soviet leaders, about their readiness to make agreements and compromises advantageous to the Soviet Union, and also about their reactions to negotiations taking place".

"A registry of trusted person is kept as a list in the "letter files". The lists should contain basic data, time and purpose of establishment of trusted relations. When the trusted relations are ended, the appropriate notations are put in the lists in a timely manner."

Whenever there's a visiting delegation, special operational groups are created including agents who have sources of information as well as Soviet citizens who deal with foreigners; they are placed in the Soviet delegations as experts, advisors, translators, protocol service etc. and accompany the foreign delegation around the country to their various meetings.

"A packed schedule of meetings with agents and trusted contacts is set up, signals are established to call them to extraordinary meetings, the procedure is established to transfer and implement especially urgent information."

- Of great interest are international conferences, exhibits, festivals etc. attended by prominent scientists, artists. Intelligence agents must provide Soviet officials that run these conferences information about the plans and intentions of the foreign visitors and ensure counterintelligence measures; they must obtain information about "possible provocations, terrorist and other anti-Soviet acts"

p. 81

"As a result of systematic campaigns of spy mania in the main capitalist countries, every officer of an official Soviet representative office is perceived as an officer of intelligence or an agent of state security agencies. However, Soviet citizens who are on brief trips abroad are not always under observation of the enemy's intelligence service and have greater freedom of movement around the country and enjoy greater trust on the part of local citizens, especially if the Soviet representatives are specialists in their fields and well known for their official activity in political, social, scientific, athletic, business and other circles. Therefore, the results of the work of the officially active reserve of the PGU (by agency), agent, or Soviet citizens or trusted contacts to a larger extent depends on their ability to enter into the environment in which they must move in accordance with their official functions, to adapt to it and occupy an authoritative position. This can be done even by those intelligence officers who were previously known by the intelligence service of the enemy as officers of the state security agents. With deep and comprehensive mastery of their specialty according to their cover organization, they can successfully resolve information and other intelligence tasks both on USSR territory and abroad during brief business trips."

p. 82

- coded telegrams sent to the Center with information from operatives on short trips abroad have a special index so that they can be monitored while they are abroad

"Naturally, the operative, agent or trusted person from among Soviet citizens, while on a short business trip abroad, is himself an object of study and is viewed by the enemy as a carrier of information. Therefore, during preparation for travel abroad, they are given theses, in accordance with which they must answer likely questions or express relevant judgements on their own initiative."

"It is known that the enemy tries to bring targeted information to Soviet representatives during their stay abroad. Therefore, all materials obtained, the circumstances of their receipt and sources require careful analysis."

p. 84

"The topic (political, economic, military) which is planned to be clarified from the foreigner during his visit to the USSR may be divided into questions. Each one of them separately will not provoke his wariness, but taken together, they will enable the compilation of a fairly full picture of the issue as a whole."

Not only regular KGB agents are used for this, but various public figures, scientists, ministers, etc. at the request of the KGB; the agents' network will put the necessary questions they need into the agenda for meetings with foreigners.

"Thus, the foreigner of interest to intelligence is put under conditions on Soviet territory where intelligence can use his knowledge to the maximum about the issue requiring informational coverage."

p. 85

"Aside from obtaining information during the process of talks with foreigners during their stay in the USSR, it can be obtained (or supplemented) by making copies of the documents and notes in their possession through clandestine search of their belongings, and also with the help of acoustic surveillance technology."

p. 86

Chapter 5

Active Measures

Active measures are for a good cause - improving international relations, disrupting the aggressive plans of imperialist states against the USSR, weakening the political, military, economic and ideological positions of imperialism; influencing countries to positions advantageous to the USSR; supporting national liberation movements; undermining and compromising anti-Soviet emigre organizations.

Service "A" of the PGU undertakes active measures as do KGB divisions with the obligatory approval of Service A.

"Methods of conducting active measures may vary depending on the nature of the tasks to be done and the presence of agent and operational capacities. The most widespread are: disinformation, exposure, compromising, special positive influence. In practice, these methods are often used in combination with each other with raises the effectiveness of the actions performed."

"Disinformation is the conspiratorial promotion to the enemy of fabricated news, especially prepared materials and documents, so as to lead him into confusion and motivate him to decisions and actions that meet the interests of the Soviet state. Disinformation measures are undertaken to undermine the positions of imperialism in various countries of the world, increase the contradictions among imperialist states, bourgeois political parties and individual figures, to weaken their positions, counteract the unleashing of anti-Soviet campaigns and also for the purposes of influencing the outcome of negotiations not only on political matters but in concluding major trade deals with foreign companies and firms etc."

"Exposure as a method of active measures is used to reveal to the world public or the public of individual countries secret anti-Soviet plots, aggressive plans and intentions, bad deeds and other such actions of military political groupings of the enemy, state agencies, parties and their leaders and also the revelation of subversive plans of imperialist states against the socialist countries, national-liberation movements, progressive regimes and democratic forces. Exposure operations can have significant influence on the formation of public opinion abroad in the direction favorable to the Soviet Union, enable the strengthening of anti-American sentiments in various countries, the growth of the anti-war movement and so on."

- Compromise is used to damage politically or morally states, political, religious etc. organizations and anti-Soviet emigre centers

"Special positive influence involves making an influence on a government party, individual political, state, civic figures, representatives of business circles advantageous to the USSR, as a rule, within the laws of the country under surveillance."

p. 88

"Forms for conducting active measures by such methods are very diverse: influential talks with prominent figures of foreign countries, upon whom depends important political decision; promoting targeted information and disinformation; bringing documentary materials advantageous to the Soviet Union to individual state, political and civic figures as well as civic organizations; publication in the foreign press of articles, publication of books, brochures, leaflets in the name of foreign authors; organization of radio and television broadcasts; press conferences and interviews with prominent state, political and civic figures, prominent scientists and other influential foreigners in accordance with the theses prepared by Service "A" of the PGU; instigation in foreign countries of meetings, rallies, demonstrations, appeals to the governments, inquiries in parliaments; promotion of decisions, resolutions, manifestos corresponding to the interests of the Soviet Union and so on."

- given importance of the press in western countries, special attention should go to foreign journalists, commentators, publishers.

"Their appearances with the use of our theses in the press, on the radio and on television can influence the public in the countries of the enemy in a light favorable to the USSR".

- agents in religious organizations can be effective on the issues of war and peace, promoting the anti-war movement, supporting Soviet initiatives, and also can "counteract the Vatican's subversive actions and neutralize the tendencies in the Islamic movement hostile to the USSR".

p. 91

- visitors to the USSR are steered toward information of interest to the USSR, with the help of intelligence agents, they get targeted information.

"Of important significance is the constant nature of the actions on the foreigner during the entire period of his stay in the USSR, the diversity of means of influence, the wide selection of necessary specialists and authorities, the presence of conditions for creating an atmosphere enabling the increase in the foreigner of the susceptibility of the influence on him."

p. 94

- disinformation work with books and brochures isn't that different than the "legal" rezidentura's work with APN news, Soviet Peace Committee materials etc.

"The fundamental difference between propagandistic measures from active actions of intelligence is that Soviet organizations speaks on their own behalf, but intelligence operates under a false flag, using the means, forms and methods available to it.

p. 95

"An important component of the preparation of an active measure is the development of a legend and the sequence of actions by the agents' network. For example, in bringing targeted information to a foreign on USSR territory, the likelihood of questions arising regarding its source must be foreseen. Therefore, in giving the assignment to the agent to advance "information" in prepared thesis, news from the local press, especially discovered literature and so on must be included. This enables the agent (or trusted person) to show mastery of the problem discussed and to thus cloak the involvement of intelligence to the measure conducted."

- checking reactions is obligatory

- find out foreigner's intent on how the information will be used, i.e. in a report to leadership, publications, party discussions etc.

"Each active measure conducted is registered within a two-day period in Service 'A' of the PGU".

Include number and date of assignment, time, place, form, channel of realization (in encrypted form), information about result and reactions.

p. 97

Chapter 6

Intelligence at International Conferences

- each year there are 300 international forums within the USSR and 700 abroad in which the Soviet Union takes part

- the KGB ensures these events are held with political interests of USSR

- World Festival of Youth and Students in Moscow in 1985 - "favorable conditions were created for operational activity which enabled useful contacts to be made with foreigners, to study them, to develop them and attract them to collaboration."

- get information and influence foreigners

- expose US intents dangerous to world peace

- agents' network abroad can get info in advance on foreign delegations

Other international events:

- Goodwill World Games, 1986

- Scientists for peace, against nuclear war (1986)

- Conference of civil society - USSR-USA (1986, 1987, 1988)

- Forum for a Non-Nuclear World, for the Survival of Humankind (1987)

- these events and many others "enabled the development of a sufficiently accurate system of cooperation and coordination between divisions conducting political intelligence from USSR territory and the KGB's counter-intelligence apparats".

- intelligence groups formed to work them -- Directorate RT of the PGU, geographic and other operational departments, Directorate K, Service A, information and analytical departments of Headquarters

- obtain advance information about political positions, differences on these issues among the foreign delegations and individual members of them; efforts to find compromises in Soviet interests

- intelligence groups always formed to go with Soviet delegations to international conferences; operatives under cover of technical and service personnel, journalists, advisors and specialists

p. 104

Conclusion

-RT Directorate of PGU is head of political intelligence from USSR territory

- intelligence departments are created in relevant ministries, institutions and organizations and staffed with officers of the PGU, also through territorial divisions

- use of legal rezidenturas to obtain political, military, economic information and also use of active measures

- coordination with counterintelligence

- master the specific methods of political intelligence on USSR territory before learning recruitment methods, active measures

Organization charts

The Interpreter
@Interpreter_Mag
Russian-to-English translation journal, with original analysis and commentary on Russia's foreign & domestic policy.
Interpreter_Mag
False Flags in US Institutions in North Africa: Table of Contents

Acquisition and Preparation of Agent Recruits for the Purposes of Intelligence Penetration of USA Institutions (on the Example of a Number of North African Countries). Analytical Overview

Table of Contents

Introduction

1. Role of Recruiting Agents in Activization of Recruitment Work Regarding Officials of American Institutions

2. Several Issues of Methodology of Selection of Recruiting Agents

2.1. Basic requirements of recruiter agents

2.2 Selections of candidates for the role of agent recruiters from the existing agent network

2.3 Targeted recruitment of agents for the role of recruiter agents.

3. Several Issues of Organization of Work with Recruiter Agents

3.1 Training of recruiter agents

3.2 Operational training

3.3 Organization of communications

3.4 Guarantee of security and inspection

Conclusions and Recommendations

X

Acknowledgements